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Abstract
Antiviral drugs dispensed during the 2009 influenza pandemic generally failed to contain transmission. This poses the
question of whether preparedness for a future pandemic should include plans to use antiviral drugs to mitigate
transmission. Simulations using a standard transmission model that allows for infected arrivals and delayed vaccination
show that attempts to contain transmission require relatively few antiviral doses. In contrast, persistent use of antiviral drugs
when the reproduction number remains above 1 use very many doses and are unlikely to reduce the eventual attack rate
appreciably unless the stockpile is very large. A second model, in which the community has a household structure, shows
that the effectiveness of a strategy of dispensing antiviral drugs to infected households decreases rapidly with time delays in
dispensing the antivirals. Using characteristics of past pandemics it is estimated that at least 80% of primary household
cases must present upon show of symptoms to have a chance of containing transmission by dispensing antiviral drugs to
households. To determine data needs, household outbreaks were simulated with 50% receiving antiviral drugs early and
50% receiving antiviral drugs late. A test to compare the size of household outbreaks indicates that at least 100–200
household outbreaks need to be monitored to find evidence that antiviral drugs can mitigate transmission of the newly
emerged virus. Use of antiviral drugs in an early attempt to contain transmission should be part of preparedness plans for a
future influenza pandemic. Data on the incidence of the first 350 cases and the eventual attack rates of the first 200 hundred
household outbreaks should be used to estimate the initial reproduction number R and the effectiveness of antiviral drugs
to mitigate transmission. Use of antiviral drugs to mitigate general transmission should cease if these estimates indicate that
containment of transmission is unlikely.
Citation: Becker NG, Wang D (2011) Can Antiviral Drugs Contain Pandemic Influenza Transmission? PLoS ONE 6(3): e17764. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017764
Editor: Andrew Yates, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, United States of America
Received December 14, 2010; Accepted February 9, 2011; Published March 28, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Becker, Wang. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work is supported by National Health and Medical Research Council grant 471436. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and
analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: Niels.Becker@anu.edu.au
Introduction
The threat from avian influenza H1N5 prompted many
countries to establish a stockpile of antiviral drugs, [1,2,3,4], such
as oseltamivir and zananivir. The size of the antiviral stockpile and
its proposed use, therapy or prophylaxis, were keenly debated
during the preparation of pandemic management plans. The
emergence of pandemic H1N1 in 2009 prompted a variety of
strategies for the use of antiviral drugs and motivates this look at
the use of antiviral drugs for prophylaxis and implications for
decisions on the size of an antiviral stockpile for a future pandemic.
The possibility of using antiviral drugs for prophylaxis, to
mitigate transmission of pandemic influenza, arises because their
use to protect against currently circulating strains of influenza
indicates a reduced chance of being infected [5,6,7,8,9]. Also
observed are reduced levels of virus shedding [5,6,10,11,12,13,14],
which suggests a reduction in infectivity in the event of a
breakthrough infection. Use of these observations in modeling
studies suggests that stockpiles of antiviral drugs held by some
nations are sufficiently large to defer the peak of the epidemic until
a newly developed vaccine is available to control transmission
[15,16,17,18]. These results could be expected to apply to
pandemic H1N1 since, with a reproduction number estimated to
be of the order 1.2-1.5 in some localities [19,20], its transmissibility
is relatively modest.
In practice, the antiviral drugs dispensed during the 2009
influenza pandemic generally failed to contain transmission. This
prompts us to ask why timely administration of antiviral drugs to a
sufficient number of cases, exposed individuals and individuals at
high risk of exposure did not occur. Could we have done better?
On a future occasion, should we even attempt to contain
transmission with the assistance of antiviral drugs? A consideration
of these questions will inform preparedness plans for the next
pandemic.
Some argue that using antiviral drugs to mitigate transmission
merely wastes doses that are needed to treat cases experiencing
severe disease. Here ‘dose’ means a course of antiviral drugs,
typically lasting seven days. The fear of wastage is fed by the fact
that the protective effect of antiviral drugs acts only for the
duration of the dose (e.g. 7 days), so that individuals might need
several doses during a pandemic. On the other hand, if
prophylactic use of antiviral drugs is able to reduce the total
number individuals infected then there will be fewer cases with
severe disease in need of treatment with antiviral drugs. The
optimal allocation of antiviral doses to treatment and prophylaxis
depends on the size of the stockpile, effectiveness of antiviral drugs
for treatment and protection from infection, as well as the
transmission and disease progression characteristics of the new
virus strain. Many of these factors will not be known prior to the
pandemic. However, it is clearly worth asking whether a relatively
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able to reduce the eventual attack rate substantially.
Here we use simple models that contain the key features needed
to assess the impact of using antiviral drugs to mitigate
transmission. The aim is to clarify the potential benefit of timely
use of antivirals for prophylaxis and its limitations. Specifically, we
ask whether use of antiviral drugs should be included in an attempt
to contain an emerged pandemic, we provide guidance on the size
of stockpile needed for an attempt at containment and consider
what data need to be collected at the start of a pandemic to assess
the prophylactic effectiveness of antiviral drugs against the new
virus strain.
Methods
The basic model
To assess the potential for antiviral drugs to mitigate
transmission, we begin with the baseline model depicted in
Figure 1, in which homogeneous individuals mix uniformly and
experience transitions between the Susceptible, Infective and Removal
states over time. A removal is an individual who is immune as a
consequence of vaccination or recovery from an infection. Let st, it
and rt denote the proportion of individuals who are susceptible,
infectious and removed at time t. The equations describing
transmission and recovery are
dst
dt
~{bitst{ut,
dit
dt
~bitst{citzat and
drt
dt
~citzut, ð1Þ
where b governs the rate of transmission and c is the recovery rate.
For our purpose, we have added to the standard SIR epidemic
model a rate (ut) of immunisation by vaccination and a rate (at) of
importing newly infected individuals from other locations. These
two rates may be time-dependent. The initial reproduction
number is the number of secondary infections generated by a
typical single primary case at the beginning when no one else has
been infected. For this model it is given by R0~b=c. We do not
refer to this R0 as the basic reproduction number because we allow
for the possibility that awareness of a new pandemic strain may
have changed behaviour and individuals may have some immunity
against the new strain from previous exposure to other influenza
strains.
Our concern is with a strain of influenza that is newly emerged
and so individuals can be vaccinated only when a strain-specific
vaccine has been developed and tested. To accommodate this
delay, the rate of immunising susceptible individuals is assumed to
have the form
ut~
0, if tƒtv,
u,i f twtv,
 
where tv is the time when the new vaccine is ready to be
dispensed. A time-varying rate of importing new infectives is
realistic, but here we restrict attention to a constant importation
rate at~a.
Our main focus is on using antiviral drugs for prophylaxis, to
hopefully contain or delay widespread transmission. For the
moment suppose that each individual is symptomatic and presents
to the health service following onset of their symptoms. We assume
that each newly diagnosed case triggers the dispensing of m doses
of antiviral drugs to individuals who have been exposed to or are a
potential contact of that case. It is meaningful to allow non-integer
values for m if we interpret it to be the average number of doses
dispensed per case. In our model the effect of dispensing m
antiviral doses per case is to reduce the transmission rate b to bfm,
where the factor fm decreases as m increases and f0~1. Here we
use the form
fm~az(1{a)exp({bm), ð2Þ
for a variety of values of a and b satisfying 0ƒaƒ1 and bw0,s o
that fm decreases from 1 to a as m increases. This form for fm
acknowledges that the first few doses dispensed are likely to reduce
transmission more effectively because they target the closest
associates of the case. The effect on the reproduction number is to
reduce it from R0 to Rm~R0fm, which is less than R0 unless
m~0.
To monitor the depletion of the stockpile of antiviral drugs we
define kt = (total number of doses in the stockpile remaining at
time t)/(population size).
Then k0, the initial number of doses per individual, is the initial
size of the stockpile relative to the population size. When we
dispense m doses for each new case we find
kt~
k0{bmfm
Ð t
0 ixsxdx{mat, when this is positive,
0, otherwise:
(
ð3Þ
A variety of values for the parameters a, b, c, u, a and b are
used. In Table 1 we show baseline values for these parameters that
seem relevant in planning preparedness for pandemic influenza,
where the values of a, b, c and u are rates per day. Results
presented here are based on these baseline parameter values unless
indicated otherwise. Initially we assume that everyone is
susceptible, i.e. s0~1 and i0~r0~0. Transmission is seeded by
the importation of infectives.
The recovery rate c~0:25 gives a mean infectious period of
four days, the vaccination rate u~0:01 means that once developed
the vaccine can be given to 1% of the population per day and
a~0:5 means that the chance of transmission per close contact
Figure 1. Baseline transmission model. Mass vaccination and arrival of infected individuals from other locations has been added to the standard
SIR transmission model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017764.g001
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The value tv~150 days assumes that it takes five months to
develop a vaccine and get it ready for distribution.
A baseline initial value of R0~1:5, when planning to prepare
for pandemic influenza, seems sensible on the basis of past
experience. Attack rates observed during the pandemics of 1918,
1957, 1968 and 2009 are, for the most part, consistent with
R0~1:5, or less. It is, of course, possible that a pandemic strain
with a higher transmission rate might evolve. Indeed, the basic
reproduction number of the 1918 pandemic strain was almost
certainly substantially higher, but compliance with public health
measures based on social distancing during this pandemic was
high because of the recognised severity of the disease. This is
evident by observing how incidence changed as social distancing
measures were introduced and removed; see Caley et al. [21]. As a
result, although susceptibility was uniformly high the effective
reproduction number, prior to depletion of susceptibles, was about
1.5. A high level of compliance is also likely in the event of a future
pandemic strain with severe disease, suggesting that an initial
effective reproduction number below 1.5 is likely from social
distancing measures alone.
Distributing antiviral drugs to affected households
It is natural that individuals responsible for distributing antiviral
drugs are concerned about wastage in attempts to reduce
transmission, when these drugs are thought necessary to treat
severe cases and to protect essential-service personnel, such as
health care workers and police, [17]. Faced with competing
demands it is tempting to limit community distribution of antiviral
drugs to cases with laboratory-confirmed infection and individuals
with confirmed exposure. Unfortunately, laboratory confirmation
and contact tracing are time consuming and insistence on such
confirmation makes it impossible to administer antiviral drugs
quickly enough to contain transmission. A strategy of dispensing
antiviral drugs quickly and liberally to household members as soon
as the first household case presents seems to be what is needed. A
focus on households helps to clarify who is targeted for antiviral
prophylaxis and the co-location of its members makes timely
dispensing to exposed individuals feasible. We therefore look at
transmission in a community of households with a focus on
timeliness and transmission characteristics that make containment
of transmission feasible. For such a community is useful to work
with the reproduction number for infected households, [22,23,24],
which we denote RH.
To incorporate the effect of antiviral drugs on transmission into
the calculation of RH and the mean number of eventual cases, we
adopt the effect formulation of Glass and Becker [25]. They model
the effect of antiviral drugs by a change in the population
dynamics of the virus population within the host and translate this
to the corresponding change in hi, the probability that a
susceptible individual avoids being infected by a single infected
household member of generation i. Infectives of one generation
are the individuals infected by the infectives of the previous
generation, where household generation 0 contains only the
primary household case. For our purpose we also include the
corresponding effect on mi, the mean number of cases a
generation-i infective generates outside their household. As in
[25], individuals who are not infectives of generations 0 and 1 are
assumed to receive antiviral drugs before being infected and
therefore derive the full protective effect of these drugs. Then the
values of the probabilities hi are same for i§2. As in [25], we use a
Reed-Frost model, [26,27], for within-household transmission with
the modification that the probability of avoiding infection is
generation-dependent. The 2001 Australian census data was used
to allocate a distribution to household size. With these specifica-
tions we compared the value of the reproduction number RH for
three different settings, namely when (i) no antiviral drugs are
dispensed, (ii) doses are dispensed to household members two days
after the primary case is infected, and (iii) doses are dispensed four
days after the primary case is infected.
In order to determine the largest fraction of non-compliance
that still permits transmission to be contained, we also compute the
effect of antiviral drugs on the reproduction number RH when a
fraction p of primary household cases fails to present early enough
for the household to receive antiviral drugs.
Finally, we determine how many household outbreaks might
need to be observed to provide evidence that the antiviral drugs
are indeed effective against the newly emerged virus strain. Here
we look at establishing effectiveness via a simple comparison of the
mean outbreak size in households that receive antiviral drugs early
with the mean outbreak size in households that receive them late.
This comparison of means must accommodate heterogeneity in
variances and a number of tests permit this. We have chosen to use
the Alexander-Govern test [28], because its computations are
relatively simple, good performance has been demonstrated [29]
and it provides a simple and direct way to combine the
comparisons for households of different sizes.
Results
Transmission: contained or not contained
The model given by equations (1)–(3) was used, with a range of
plausible parameters values, to determine the eventual attack rate
(percentage of the population infected). The consistent findings are
illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the eventual attack rate as
given by the model with (a) a~0:5 and (b) a~0:75 and other
parameters assuming the baseline values of Table 1. The smallest
value for Rm is 0.75 when a~0:5 and 1.125 when a~0:75.
For all parameter values, increasing m from zero decreases the
transmission rate bfm and this is reflected in a decline in the
eventual attack rate (AR). For larger values of m, we see an
increase in AR as m increases. This arises because the value of the
transmission rate bfm returns to b as the stockpile is depleted and
epidemic transmission resumes (slightly tempered by a depletion of
susceptibles).
When Rm can be brought below 1, as in Figure 2(a), there is a
very steep decline in AR as m increases and Rm approaches 1.
Note that AR remains very low for a substantial range of values of
m. The range of m values for which transmission is contained
depends on the size of the stockpile. The existence of a wide range
of near-optimal values for m and the fact that transmission is
contained for any value of m in this range provide realistic scope
for practical and effective use of antiviral drugs for prophylaxis.
In contrast, when Rm cannot be brought below 1, as in Figure 2(b),
asmallvalueofm can inducea reduction in the attack rate. However,
noting the scale on the vertical axis in Figure 2(b), we see that the
reduction is small and very localised. It is difficult to utilise this
optimal dosage in practice because its value depends on factors that
are unknown and difficult to estimate with adequate precision.
Table 1. Baseline values for model parameters.
ab c R0 tv u ab
10{6 0.375 0.25 1.5 150 0.01 0.5 0.2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017764.t001
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The eventual number of antiviral doses dispensed per
community member can be computed numerically from equations
(1)–(3). When transmission can be contained, it is more
informative to work with a simple expression that approximates
antiviral usage, because this expression reflects directly how
various factors affect the usage.
When Rm remains below 1 there is relatively little depletion of
susceptibles, so we may write
dit
dt
~bfmit{citza:
Then the fraction of infectives is soon near its equilibrium value of
a=(c{cRm) and the number of doses of antiviral drugs dispensed
per community member is approximately
DAV~
ma(tvztc)
1{Rm
, ð4Þ
where tv is the time when the vaccine is ready to be dispensed and
tc~(1{1=R0)=u is the additional time required to reach a
vaccination coverage that brings the effective reproduction
number below 1. By way of illustration, note that equation (4)
indicates that the required number of antiviral drug doses will be
equal to 1.2% of the population size when m~10 and other
parameters assume their baseline value. This allows for one
imported infective per day for every million population members,
for a duration of six months, and all the transmission chains they
generate. Prior to the 2009 pandemic many nations held antiviral
stockpiles with doses that numbered more than 20% of their
population. Only a small fraction of this would be needed for
sustained containment of transmission until the vaccine controls
transmission.
The 1.2% we calculated above is based on sustained
containment for six months. When containment is not achievable
we would become aware of this quite early and would abandon the
attempt of containment having spent a small fraction of the
stockpile. For example, Becker et al. [30] show that a useful
estimate of the initial reproduction number is obtained once the
cumulative incidence reaches 350–500 cases. With m~10 doses
per case and a population of 1 million, we would therefore
abandon the attempt at containment having spent antiviral doses
numbering less than 0.05% of the population size if the estimate of
R0 indicates containment is infeasible.
More generally, the total number of antiviral doses used, as given
by (4), increases linearly with the rate of importations (a), and the
time until the vaccine is able to control transmission (tvztc).
Together, these terms contribute the factor a(tvztc), which is the
mean number of importations of infected cases from the start of the
pandemic until the vaccine is able to reduce the reproduction
number below 1. The remaining factor in (3) is AV~m=(1{Rm),
the mean number of doses dispensed for each outbreak initiated by
a single infective. Its dependence on m is shown in Figure 3. We see
that AV declines rapidly to a minimum as m increases just beyond
thevalue requiredto bringRm below1.Theoptimal m occurs when
Rm is about 0.8 and the gradual increase in AV for larger values of
m indicates that nothing is gained by striving to achieve a value of
Rm smaller than 0.8. Figure 3 illustrates that this conclusion is not
sensitive to our assumed value of b.
The encouraging conclusion that a relatively small stockpile of
antiviral drugs is needed for an attempt to contain the pandemic
locally is not a consequence of the specific model (1). The same
conclusion is reached from branching process models under quite
general assumptions about characteristics of transmission and
disease progression.
The enormous benefit of local containment of a pandemic virus
strain can be realised only when (i) antiviral drugs are effective
enough to reduce the reproduction number from its initial value of
R0 to a value below 1, and (ii) timely distribution of antiviral drugs
to appropriate individuals is possible in practice. In retrospect,
pandemic H1N1 influenza in 2009 seemed to satisfy condition (i),
but condition (ii) was not realised. We now consider some possible
reasons for the failure to distribute antiviral drugs effectively.
Figure 2. Eventual attack rate (AR). Percentage of the population infected, as predicted by the baseline model with (a) a~0:5 and (b) a~0:75, for
different k0 (stockpile size, as a proportion of the population size) and m (number of antiviral doses dispensed per case). Colours on the graphs range
from dark blue (low values) to dark red (high values).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017764.g002
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Consider now transmission through a community of house-
holds. Suppose that every infection that an individual generates
outside their own household is of a randomly selected community
member. During the containment phase of the pandemic, the
force of infection acting on a susceptible from outside the
household is negligible relative to the force of infection exerted
by an infectious household member. Using this we can show that,
in a community of households, the number of doses of antiviral
drugs dispensed per community member is
DAV~
mHa(tvztc)
1{RH
, ð5Þ
where mH is the mean number of antiviral doses dispensed to the
household of a newly-infected individual who is selected randomly
from the community and RH is the mean number of primary cases
generated in the community by all the cases of a household
outbreak initiated by a newly-infected individual who is selected
randomly from the community. The derivation of (5) is outlined in
Appendix S1. Equation (5) is the equivalent of (4) for a community
of households. To be valid it requires, similarly to (4), that the
reproduction number for infected households (RH) is less than 1.
Equation (5) can accommodate a variety of strategies for
dispensing antiviral doses to households, including ‘‘every
household member’’ and ‘‘every household case upon onset of
their symptoms’’. From (5) we conclude, as for (4), that an attempt
to contain transmission uses relatively few doses of antiviral drugs,
be it sustained containment of transmission or an attempt to
contain transmission that is abandoned once it becomes clear that
containment is not feasible.
Thekeytocontainingtransmission inacommunityofhouseholds
lies in the ability to bring RH below 1. We now take a closer look at
what isrequired tobring RH below1,undertheassumptionthat the
effectiveness of antiviral drugs for reducing susceptibility and
infectivity for the emerged virus strain is as estimated for currently
circulating influenza strains. The effect of antivirals on reducing
transmission is modeled as in Glass and Becker [25].
To show the roles of within and between household transmis-
sion we display results in terms of m, the mean number of
individuals an infective infects outside their household, and h, the
probability that a susceptible household partner avoids infectious
contact with a household case during the latter’s infectious period.
These interpretations of m and h apply for a totally susceptible
community in which antiviral drugs are not used. The curves in
Figure 4 display values of m and h for which RH~1 in three
scenarios, namely (a) antivirals are dispensed at onset of symptoms
in the primary case (two days after infection), (b) antivirals are
dispensed two days after onset of symptoms in the primary
household case, [2,4] and (c) no antiviral drugs are dispensed. For
each curve in Figure 4, parameter pairs (m,h) that lie below the
curve satisfy RHv1, while RHw1 for parameter coordinates
above the curve. By comparing the two lowest curves we see that
dispensing drugs to all family members two days after onset of
symptoms in the primary case expands the set of parameter values
for which RHv1 only a little. In contrast, dispensing drugs at
onset of symptoms in the primary case expands the set of
parameter values for which RHv1 substantially. In other words,
the set of scenarios for which containment becomes feasible is
much larger when antiviral drugs are dispensed as soon as
possible. When we compute values of RH for parameter pairs (h,m)
lying on curve (a) but assuming that no antiviral drugs are
dispensed we obtain values in the range 1.9–2.7. This shows that
antiviral drugs can bring a reproduction number that is well above
1 down to a value of 1 if they are dispensed at onset of symptoms
in the primary case.
Timely dispensing of antiviral drugs is so important because, as
reflected in the model, individuals infected with influenza become
infectious prior to onset of symptoms and the bulk of their total
infection potential has passed 2–3 days after symptom onset.
Failure to present
Figure 4 illustrates that failure to present early can reduce the
effectiveness of using antiviral drugs to mitigate transmission.
People might fail to present because their clinical symptoms are
not severe or present late due to delayed access to health services.
It seems likely that use of antiviral drugs to contain transmission of
pandemic H1N1 influenza in 2009 was not successful because the
fraction of infected individuals who failed to present, or presented
late, was too high. It is useful to have a way of determining how
Figure 3. Doses used per imported case. Mean number of doses used to contain each outbreak initiated by one infected arrival, when m doses
are dispensed for every case.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017764.g003
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present late, limits the chance of containing transmission.
Let p denote the proportion of primary household cases that fail
to present early. Under the assumption that every member of a
household whose primary case presents early receives a dose of
antiviral drugs and that other households get no antiviral drugs the
reproduction number for infected households becomes pRH0z
(1{p)RH, where RH0 is the household reproduction number when
no antiviral drugs are dispensed and RH is the household
reproduction number when antiviral drugs are dispensed to all
infected households. This reproduction number is equal to 1 when
p~
1{RH
RH0{RH
: ð6Þ
Therefore, even when RHv1, it is not possible to contain
transmission if the proportion primary household cases who fail to
present early is greater than the right hand side of (6).
Figure 5 shows the curves (6) for the values RH0~1:5 and
RH0~2:5 for various values of RH that might be obtained when
antiviral drugs are dispensed to members of those households
where the primary case presents early. For values of p below the
curve it is possible to contain transmission, but for values of p
above the curve it is not. Suppose we can reduce the reproduction
number for household outbreaks to RH~0:8 when antiviral drugs
are dispensed to all infected households. Then containment of
transmission requires that less than 29% of primary cases fail to
present early when RH0~1:5, and less than 12% when RH0~2:5.
Are antiviral drugs effective against the newly emerged
virus strain?
The motivation to create a stockpile of antiviral drugs is based
on their demonstrated effectiveness against currently circulating
influenza strains. There is no guarantee that these drugs will be
equally effective, or even effective at all, against a newly emerged
pandemic strain of influenza. Informed decisions about the use of
antiviral drugs in a pandemic require effectiveness for reducing
transmission to be established from incidence data collected early
in a pandemic. In preparation we need to know what data, and
how much, are required to establish effectiveness. Glass and
Becker [25] consider this question by estimating two specific
parameters, one quantifying the effect on susceptibility and the
other the effect on infectivity. Here we look at establishing
effectiveness by comparing mean outbreak size in households that
receive antiviral drugs early and households that receive them late.
We have to allow for different household sizes. Households of size
one provide no information for our comparison and we restrict
attention to households of sizes two, three and four. The
Australian census data indicate that the relative frequency of
households of size 2, 3 and 4 is about 50%, 25% and 25%.
Allowing for size-biased sampling we expect to observe roughly an
equal number of outbreaks in households of size 2, 3 and 4.
Accordingly, we assume that we observe n outbreaks in households
that receive antiviral drugs at onset of symptoms in the primary
household case in households of size 2, 3 and 4, making 3n
households. In addition, we assume that we observe n outbreaks in
households that receive antiviral drugs late (two days after the
onset of symptoms in the primary case) in households of size 2, 3
and 4, giving observations on another 3n household outbreaks.
An Alexander-Govern test statistic [28] is computed for the
comparison in households of a given size and values of these three
test statistics are then summed and the null hypothesis of no effect
is rejected if the sum exceeds the 95th percentile of the
x2{distribution with three degrees of freedom.
The power curve corresponding to a given antiviral effect
scenario was estimated by simulating 500 data sets, applying the
test to each data set and noting the fraction that reject the
hypothesis of equal mean outbreak sizes. Figure 6 shows the
estimated power curves for four antiviral effect scenarios similar
to the ones considered by Glass and Becker [25], which enables
a comparison of results and illustrates the findings. These
scenarios are motivated by data on antiviral effects for currently
circulating influenza strains, [25]. In the simulations we used
h~0:5 for the probability that an individual avoids being
infected by a given household infective, in the absence of
antiviral drugs.
 
Figure 4. Curves for which the reproduction number for household outbreaks (RH) equals 1. The three RH~1 curves correspond to (a)
antivirals are dispensed at onset of symptoms in the primary household case, (b) antivirals are dispensed two days after symptom onset in the
primary case, and (c) no antiviral drugs are dispensed. For each of these three intervention scenarios, RHv1 for every parameter point (h,m) that lies
below the RH~1 curve and RHw1 when (h,m) lies above the RH~1 curve.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017764.g004
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of transmission of an infection occurring during a contact by a
factor s for a susceptible who is on antiviral drugs at the time. The
effect on infectivity depends on the time when the infective starts
taking the antiviral drug and is measured by the factor by which
the area under the infectiousness function is reduced (i.e. the
potential to infect others is reduced). Let f denote the factor by
which the area under the infectiousness function is reduced when
the individual commences taking the drug at onset of symptoms.
The curves (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 6 show the power as n varies
for the effect scenario with f~0:73 and s~0, 0.5 and 1,
respectively. Each point on the curve is obtained by simulating 500
data sets and observing the fraction that reject the no-effect
hypothesis when our modified Alexander-Govern test is used.
Curve (d) assumes the effect scenario with f~1, no effect on
infectivity, and s~0:5, partial effect on susceptibility.
When considering the results in Figure 6 it is useful to keep in
mind that monitoring infected households for cases is labour-
intensive. In practice, monitoring more than 300 household
outbreaks during the busy early stages of a pandemic would be
very challenging. We would therefore like 6n, the total number of
household outbreaks monitored, to be less than 300. Let us take a
power of 80% as a minimum requirement. Inspecting curves (a),
(b) and (c), which are generated by including a common effect on
infectivity, illustrates that observations on 100{200 household
outbreaks has a power of at least 80% of detecting an antiviral
effect if there is also a moderate effect on susceptibility, but many
more households are needed if susceptibility is not reduced.
Comparing curves (b) and (d), which are generated by including a
moderate effect on susceptibility, illustrates that a total of
150{200 household outbreaks are needed to detect an effect if
there is also a moderate effect on infectivity, but many more
households are needed if the effect on infectivity is weak.
The hope that a direct comparison of mean outbreak size for
households would require less data than a comparison based on
specific parameters, as in [25], was not realised. The two
approaches indicate approximately the same data needs. Howev-
er, it is reassuring that a simple test based on minimal assumptions
about the nature of transmission in the community can detect an
antiviral effect with about the same amount of data.
Discussion
Our aim was to see whether antiviral drugs should be used to
mitigate general transmission following emergence of a future
pandemic influenza strain. The main conclusion is a strong
recommendation that liberal and timely use of antiviral drugs
should be part of an attempt at local containment of transmission.
The case for this lies in the substantial benefits of successful
containment and the fact that the accumulated use of antiviral
drugs over a period of successful containment is modest, even
when the immigration rate of infected arrivals is high. The
recommended plan for the attempt at containment must include
abandoning prophylactic use of antiviral drugs once there is strong
empirical evidence that containment is unlikely to succeed,
because continued use of antiviral drugs to mitigate transmission
when early containment fails is likely to use a very sizable supply of
antiviral drugs with little benefit. The likelihood of successful
containment should be evident by the time 350 cases have been
reported and we have data on 200 household outbreaks.
Our basic first model acknowledges that the first few doses of
antivirals dispensed per case can be targeted more effectively than
a similar number of additional doses. That is, dispensing very
many doses per cases is wasteful and likely to attract justified
criticisms and objections. A practical way to dispense doses to
close contacts only is to target household members of cases who
present. Accordingly, our second model considers transmission
through a community with a household structure and we
considered delays in presentation. The conclusion that an attempt
to contain transmission uses relatively few antiviral doses
continues to hold in this setting. We also conclude that successful
containment of transmission, if possible, requires early presenta-
tion by the primary household case. We cannot wait for
laboratory confirmation of a strain-specific infection. The
number of doses used by an attempt to contain transmission is
Figure 5. How the possibility to contain transmission depends on the proportion who fail to present early. Transmission can be
contained for values of p below the curve, where p is the proportion of primary household cases who fail to present early, RH is the household
reproduction number when all infected households receive antiviral drugs and the household reproduction number without antiviral drugs is
RH0~1:5 for curve (a) and RH0~2:5 for curve (b).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017764.g005
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transmission remains, to be liberal in dispensing doses to
household members of any early presenter with clinical symptoms
that are consistent with a pandemic-strain infection.
Next we allowed for failure by a fraction of primary household
cases to present soon after onset of symptoms. The conclusion is
that, even when antivirals are adequately effective, containment is
not possible if more than a modest fraction of primary household
cases fail to present early. In our illustration we required the
proportion of primary cases who fail to present early to be smaller
than 20%. This 20% includes asymptomatic cases, mildly-
symptomatic cases who do not bother to present and symptomatic
cases unable to gain timely access to a health service provider.
Finally, appropriate data must be collected at the start of the
local outbreak to estimate the initial reproduction number and to
confirm that antiviral drugs do reduce transmission of the new
strain of influenza virus. It is concluded that we can expect to
detect an antiviral effect on transmission from data on 100{200
household outbreaks only if the antiviral drug has a moderate
effect on both susceptibility and infectivity (of the same order as for
currently circulating strains of influenza).
These conclusions are not consequences of the simplifying
assumptions made in the specific models of this paper. They rely
primarily on the threshold result that Rv1 implies containment
and this result holds under a very wide range of community
settings and disease characteristics. The likelihood of achieving
Rv1 depends critically on the transmission characteristics of the
newly emerged disease and our ability to deliver antiviral drugs
early enough to affected households. With pandemic H1N109 we
were close in some locations. For example, in Western Australia,
as in some other localities, most early cases were imported
infections indicating that Rv1 was maintained for a substantial
period, [31]. With clear understanding and confidence that
continued liberal use of antiviral drugs is the best option at that
stage it may have been possible to sustain Rv1 longer.
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